By Ahmad Rafat
In recent weeks, the debate over Iran’s relationship with Russia has become one of the most contentious issues in the country’s domestic politics. From the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) to social media and statements by political parties, Russia has once again taken center stage in Tehran’s political disputes.
Two opposing viewpoints are at the heart of this controversy. One camp argues that Iran’s ties with Moscow are strategic and represent the only viable path out of international isolation.
The other warns that Tehran must avoid becoming a pawn in Russia’s geopolitical games — used merely as leverage in Moscow’s dealings with the United States, Europe, or regional powers.
Former President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif are among those who reject the notion of a “strategic partnership.” They contend that Vladimir Putin’s Russia does not regard the Islamic Republic as an equal ally, and instead, that it seeks every opportunity to weaken it.
While critics of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “Look to the East” policy stop short of calling for a break with Moscow, they contend that Tehran should also focus on restoring its relations with the West.
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On the opposite side, factions close to the Leader’s office, including the ultraconservative Kayhan newspaper, Majlis Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and other Russophile figures, maintain that Russia is Iran’s steadfast strategic partner, one that will never abandon the country.
In a recent speech in the Majlis, Ghalibaf sharply criticized Rouhani and Zarif, declaring: “At a time when our strategic cooperation with Russia is progressing, the irresponsible remarks and unprofessional actions of previous administrations have harmed this process.”
Many within Iran believe that Russia is already positioning itself for the post-Khamenei era.
Reports suggest that Moscow opposes the succession of Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and, based on its analysis of Iran’s shifting political landscape and growing criticism of the Supreme Leader from senior Shia Marja (religious authorities), has concluded that, after Khamenei’s death, power should shift from the clergy to the military.
Observers say that Russia is now cultivating alliances among top commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and security agencies to prepare for that transition. They suggest that the aim is to create in Iran a variation of the “managed succession” that enabled Vladimir Putin and Russia’s security services to seize power after the Soviet Union dissolved.
The so-called “strategic cooperation” championed by Russophiles took shape in January when details of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow and his meeting with Vladimir Putin were leaked.
The two leaders discussed a 25-year comprehensive agreement consisting of 47 articles, 12 of which focus specifically on security and military collaboration. These provisions reportedly grant Russian security and military agencies influence within Iran’s own defense institutions.
Recently, Zarif remarked that the normalization of Iran’s relations with the West constitutes “Russia’s red line,” a statement that provoked a sharp backlash from pro-Russian politicians, who are increasingly vocal about their loyalty to Moscow.
Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former Majlis deputy and past chairman of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has been outspoken in warning against such dependency.
“Russia has never viewed Iran strategically,” he said. “It traps us and, at key historical moments, uses Iran as a bargaining chip with the West.”
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He added: “The extremist Russia-lovers in Iran will one day have to answer for the damage this dependency has caused.”
Falahatpisheh also claimed that Moscow’s influence in Iran extends deeply into domestic politics, even affecting the vetting and disqualification of Majlis candidates. He said he was personally warned not to “cross Russia” if he wished to continue his political career.
The Tehran-based Kayhan newspaper has also entered the fray, accusing reformists of “Russophobia” to curry favor with the West. The paper wrote: “While Europe’s resolution against Iran is still fresh and Western threats and humiliations continue, reformists celebrate negotiations with the West and make Russophobia the core of their policy — even though Russia voted against Europe’s resolution on Iran.”
Moscow and Beijing’s refusal to recognize the reinstatement of UN Security Council sanctions, following the European “snapback” mechanism, has further strengthened the position of Russophiles in Tehran.
Shortly after these sanctions were reimposed, Ali Larijani — Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and advisor to Khamenei — traveled to Moscow, carrying a personal letter from the Supreme Leader.
While the contents of the letter remain undisclosed, reports suggest that Khamenei reminded Putin of Iran’s military support for Russia in the Ukraine war and requested reciprocal assistance amid Tehran’s deepening isolation.
Alongside Belarus and North Korea, Iran remains one of the few countries that has backed Russia unconditionally during the conflict.
Following Larijani’s visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed that military cooperation with Iran would continue “in accordance with international law.”
His remarks came despite the reimposition of UN arms sanctions — lifted after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, but reinstated on Sept. 27.
Dismissing those sanctions, Lavrov insisted: “With the lifting of UN restrictions, there are no limits on our military-technical cooperation with Iran. We will continue to supply the equipment it needs, fully in accordance with international law.”
