By Ahmad Rafat
The Islamic Republic of Iran currently finds itself engulfed in a multitude of crises: a deepening water shortage as reservoirs run dry; an electricity crisis marked by relentless blackouts; the fallout from its twelve-day war with Israel, with the threat of renewed strikes. Now, another potential disaster looms: the automatic reimposition, at the end of August, of international sanctions through the “snapback” mechanism triggered by the E3 countries — France, Britain, and Germany.
Iran’s economy, already battered by the U.S.’s 2018 withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, and the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, is plunged in a deep crisis. A full reinstatement of international sanctions through the “snapback” mechanism could push it into paralysis.
The three European signatories have given Tehran until the end of August to re-engage in negotiations and seek a diplomatic path for its nuclear program.
With the deadline only days away and no indication of Iranian willingness to compromise, it seems increasingly likely that the United Nations Security Council will take up the question of triggering the “snapback” mechanism by late September.
Islamic Republic Says It Will Respond to Reimposition of UN Sanctions
The “snapback” mechanism, embedded in the Iran nuclear deal and codified in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, enables the rapid and automatic restoration of international sanctions on Iran if it breaches its nuclear obligations.
Crucially, this process bypasses the need for a new Security Council vote, stripping Iran’s allies — China and Russia — of the power to block it with a veto.
The U.S., however, forfeited its ability to trigger the mechanism after President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the JCPOA in 2018.
Once the three European states submit their requests, the UN Security Council has 30 days to act.
It can either adopt a resolution to keep sanctions suspended — an option which is certain to be vetoed by the U.S., France, and Britain — or allow the pre-October 2015 sanctions to snap back automatically.
In effect, the six earlier Security Council resolutions (meaning Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929, which were passed between 2006 and 2010) would all be reinstated.
These measures were first imposed during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (August 2005–August 2013).
With the JCPOA’s ten-year term expiring in mid-October, the Europeans have only two weeks left to pull the trigger on the snapback mechanism.
In 2018, during Trump’s first presidency, Washington imposed sweeping sanctions on Iran. These measures remained in place throughout his successor President Joe Biden’s term, and prevailed after Trump’s return to the White House.
The sanctions struck at the core of Iran’s economy — oil and gas, banking, insurance, shipping, automotive, and even food and medicine.
The U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted the Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), and dozens of other entities, while Iranian banks were cut off from the SWIFT global financial network.
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is a global messaging system that enables banks and financial institutions to exchange secure, standardized instructions for international financial transactions.
In January of this year, Trump escalated the measures further, approving new restrictions that bar non-American firms from U.S. markets if they maintain ties with Tehran.
The result: European, Asian, and regional companies, wary of U.S. reprisals, have largely steered clear of Iran.
With the activation of the “snapback” mechanism, binding international sanctions will be reinstated, enforceable by all 193 UN member states – dramatically intensifying economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
Unlike unilateral U.S. sanctions, those reimposed through the “snapback” mechanism carry the weight of international law, a broader scope, and collective legitimacy.
Under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII, it is critical to note that these sanctions officially name the Islamic Republic as a “rogue state.”
While UN sanctions do not explicitly prohibit Iranian oil exports, their reinstatement through the “snapback” mechanism would effectively usher Iran’s oil trade into a new era of restriction and isolation.
Currently, Iran moves a significant portion of its oil through informal channels to China at steep discounts, using a web of “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet” tankers, flag-switching, falsified origins, and barter or yuan-denominated transactions.
Once the “snapback” mechanism is enacted, the EU would once again blacklist the Central Bank of Iran, the NIOC, and the NITC. Consequently, any collaboration with these entities — including insurance, shipping, refueling, port services, or financial operations — would become illegal for numerous countries.
Another outcome of triggering the “snapback” mechanism is the reinstatement of arms and missile sanctions.
Arms restrictions, lifted in 2020 under the nuclear deal, and missile limitations, which expired in 2023, would both be revived.
Simultaneously, all nuclear enrichment activities would once again be considered illegal under UN Security Council resolutions.
Activating the “snapback” mechanism would effectively mark the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, has characterized the E3’s decision as a declaration of war, warning of severe retaliation.
Some political factions in Tehran contend that if the “snapback” mechanism is triggered, the Islamic Republic should immediately withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The recent closures of the German and British embassies in Tehran are widely seen as a response to the looming threat posed by the E3’s potential use of the mechanism.
Historically, in the months following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has repeatedly targeted foreign diplomatic missions in retaliation for perceived threats or hostile actions — beginning with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy on Nov. 4, 1979.
Over the past four decades, the embassies of countries including Britain, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Azerbaijan have all faced attacks on Iranian soil.
