By Ahmad Rafat
The twelve-day war with Israel, which took place between June 13 and 24, has intensified the political crisis engulfing the Islamic Republic — a regime established following the 1979 anti-monarchy revolution led by Ruhollah Khomeini.
Many observers believe the regime is entering its final phase.
The political influence of Ali Khamenei, who became Iran’s Supreme Leader after Khomeini’s death in June 1989, also appears to be waning.
Amid this turmoil, questions are being raised both within Iran and internationally: Who will lead the country after Khamenei? How will the succession unfold?
Most importantly, what will Iran’s future political structure look like? Will this transition pave the way for a semi-democratic government, or will it usher in a new form of authoritarianism?
Even before the twelve-day war and the U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 22 — codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer — targeted sites like the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Isfahan Province, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology and Research Center, and the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant near Qom (approximately 140 kilometers south of Tehran), some held out hope that military action might spark regime change.
However, neither Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor U.S. President Donald Trump had a concrete plan to bring down the regime.
Israel aimed primarily to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, while Trump consistently said his goal was not regime change but a shift in the regime’s behavior.
In short, both countries struck Iran not to foster democracy, but to contain the threats posed by the Islamic Republic.
A pragmatic, security-centered approach guided the Trump administration’s Middle East policy. Rather than promoting democracy, Washington prioritized containing security threats, controlling weapons programs, and maintaining regional stability.
Central to these concerns was the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its nuclear ambitions and its involvement in proxy networks across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
In this context, the U.S. has shown a willingness to cooperate with any regime –regardless of its authoritarian nature — if it contributes to regional stability and does not pose a threat to Israel. This strategic flexibility has been evident in numerous cases.
Following the twelve-day war with Israel, and even in the lead-up to it, Khamenei had already seen his influence wither, effectively becoming a symbolic figurehead within the regime.
At the same time, decision-making power increasingly shifted to influential figures within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and economic actors who had gained prominence because of international sanctions.
Many European and American analysts believe that efforts to remove Khamenei from power have already begun within the Iranian regime.
At best, such efforts might pave the way for a military-political leadership more open to limited engagement with the West, potentially including a nuclear agreement, de-escalation with Israel, and a reassessment of ties with Western powers.
However, these shifts are unlikely to result in substantial domestic reforms or genuine political liberalization.
In a post-Khamenei Islamic Republic, the regime could temporarily suspend its nuclear program, scale back support for regional proxy forces, and enter partial diplomatic negotiations with the West.
Domestically, such a regime might ease certain social restrictions — such as the mandatory hejab — and make modest concessions to address public discontent.
At the same time, alternative visions for Iran’s future are emerging from within the country.
Mir-Hossein Mousavi — the Islamic Republic’s last prime minister and a prominent leader of the 2009 Green Movement — has recently called for a referendum, overseen by international observers, to form a constituent assembly responsible for drafting a new constitution.
Mousavi has been under house arrest with his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, since Feb. 14, 2011.
As the current regime is highly unlikely to permit such a referendum, the only viable path to realizing it would require broad, sustained pressure from society.
However, at present, Iran’s civil and political sectors appear too fragmented to mount the unified effort necessary to force the regime to accept a referendum that could ultimately lead to its dissolution.
Khamenei’s supporters see this proposal, and the broader effort to replace the Islamic Republic with a Western-friendly government, as a coup.
They allege that it is being orchestrated by figures such as the current president, Massoud Pezeshkian, the former President, Hassan Rouhani, and the Head of the Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei.
They also dismiss Mousavi’s plan as an Israeli-backed scheme, despite his statements containing elements of anti-Israel rhetoric.
On one issue, however, there is a rare agreement between the ruling regime and much of the Iranian opposition — both within the country and abroad: a sudden and unmanaged collapse of the current system could result in widespread instability, potentially fracturing the nation and unleashing various paramilitary groups.
