By Ahmad Rafat
The nuclear agreement signed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in October 2015 with the three European countries — Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (collectively known as the E3) — alongside China and Russia, officially expired in the early hours of Sunday, Sept. 28.
Concurrently, the comprehensive international sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, were automatically reinstated.
As a result, the Islamic Republic now finds itself once again subject to broad and severe sanctions.
Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, responded to the reimposition of sanctions — established initially by UN Security Council resolutions between 2006 and 2010 — by declaring that the recent agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), signed on Sept. 9 in Cairo by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director Rafael Grossi, is now void.
Larijani accused the E3 of “violating their commitments,” stating: “France had conveyed, via Rafael Grossi, that if an agreement were reached with the IAEA, they would withdraw their request to trigger the ‘snapback’ mechanism. However, as usual, they did not keep their word.”
What Larijani failed to acknowledge, however, is the Islamic Republic’s own failure to implement the agreement in the days following its signing, including the denial of access for IAEA inspectors to both declared and undisclosed nuclear sites.
The “snapback” mechanism — embedded in the 2015 agreement and codified in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 — permits the rapid reinstatement of international sanctions if Iran is deemed to be in breach of its nuclear obligations.
Given that UN sanctions have now been reinstated with China’s support, the blow to the Iranian economy is substantial. China has been purchasing 90 percent of Iran’s oil and petrochemical exports. It is doubtful that Chinese refineries, especially the smaller ones that previously defied U.S. sanctions reimposed in 2018 under President Trump, will continue importing Iranian oil. They would risk breaching UN sanctions and being in violation of international law.
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Following the UN Security Council session — which rejected a joint China-Russia resolution aimed at delaying activation of the “snapback” mechanism by six months — Foreign Minister Araghchi gave a stern response.
“This decision by the Security Council is a major blow to diplomacy and the non-proliferation process,” he said.
Araghchi echoed, albeit in more diplomatic language, the earlier warning by 71 members of Iran’s parliament (Majlis), who had called for officially pursuing nuclear weapons development.
His reference to “proliferation” leaves little doubt regarding the Islamic Republic’s intent to continue its nuclear weapons-related activities.
Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi’s efforts on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York to prevent the reimposition of international sanctions were ultimately futile, and they knew it.
The reason was apparent: Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei — the country’s sole decision-maker — had firmly opposed any agreement on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.
Just 24 hours after U.S. President Donald Trump’s address at the UN, Khamenei delivered a speech that effectively closed the door on any negotiations with Washington — a condition which the E3 had set for avoiding the activation of the “snapback” mechanism.
In his speech, Khamenei declared: “The other side breaks its promises, threatens, and, if it can, assassinates.” He described negotiations with the U.S. as “pure loss.”
Without directly referencing nuclear weapons, he underscored their strategic value: “When we are strong, the other side does not threaten us.”
Responding to Trump’s claim that Iran should never be allowed to enrich uranium, Khamenei said: “The Iranian people will slap anyone who says such a thing in the mouth.”
In response to the return of sweeping UN Security Council sanctions, Iranian officials have sought to downplay their impact.
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Some, like MP Mohsen Zanganeh, representing Torbat-e Heydarieh in the northeastern province of Khorasan Razavi, have gone so far as to frame the development as a triumph.
Shortly after the sanctions were reinstated, Zanganeh posted on X (formerly Twitter): “With the grace of God, Sept. 28 will become the national day of cutting off all hope from America and the West, and the beginning of an economic transformation based on domestic capacities and deeper ties with Eastern, neighboring, and friendly countries.”
Numerous political and military officials have downplayed the return of international sanctions, insisting they will have little impact on the country’s fragile economy or its increasing regional and global isolation.
Kazem Gharibabadi, a deputy to Araghchi, has repeatedly reassured economic stakeholders and the public in recent days that “The Islamic Republic is prepared for any scenario.”
However, officials have failed to explain how they plan to withstand the sanctions or why they claim the economy will remain unaffected — likely because no clear strategy exists.
The reimposition of international sanctions marks the full reinstatement of UN Security Council resolutions targeting the Islamic Republic, which were initially adopted between 2006 and 2010. These measures, which were broad in scope, had been suspended since July 2015, following the adoption of Resolution 2231.
The first of these, Resolution 1696, was passed in July 2006. It required Iran to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, including research and development.
This resolution, enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is legally binding on all UN member states. Subsequent resolutions — 1737, 1747, and 1803 — reaffirmed this requirement, repeatedly urging Iran to maintain the suspension of its nuclear activities.
UN Security Council Resolution 1737 imposed sanctions on Iran by identifying sensitive nuclear and missile-related items and technologies that were prohibited from being sold, supplied, or transferred to the country. It also barred all UN member states from providing Iran with technical assistance, training, investment, or financing related to these items.
Resolution 1803 broadened these restrictions by incorporating additional materials listed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
The NSG is a voluntary group of 48 countries formed in 1974 to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation by regulating exports of nuclear materials and technology. It supports peaceful nuclear trade while ensuring it does not aid weapon development.
MTCR is a non-binding arrangement of 35 countries, created in 1987 by the G7 to curb the spread of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. It relies on voluntary, consensus-based export guidelines.
Resolution 1929 further tightened sanctions, explicitly prohibiting Iran from investing in nuclear fuel cycle activities or missile technology abroad.
Although Resolution 1696 did not impose a direct arms embargo, it urged all states to “exercise vigilance” in the transfer of materials or technology that could support Iran’s missile programs.
Resolution 1737 went further by explicitly banning the supply of items and technologies listed under international export control regimes that could contribute to uranium enrichment or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, including associated training and financial assistance.
Resolution 1747 introduced the first direct arms embargo, prohibiting Iran from exporting any weapons or related equipment. It also called on UN member states to exercise “restraint” in supplying Iran with heavy conventional weapons such as tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles.
UN Security Council Resolution 1803 urged member states to inspect Iranian shipments at airports and seaports, particularly those operated by Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.
This authority was significantly expanded by Resolution 1929, which permitted inspections not only within national jurisdictions but also on the high seas. Articles 14 and 15 of this resolution authorize the inspection of all cargo entering or leaving Iran, while Article 16 allows for the seizure or destruction of prohibited items, requiring international cooperation. Article 18 further prohibits the refueling or servicing of suspicious Iranian ships, except in cases of humanitarian necessity.
Resolution 1737 introduced the first financial sanctions, including asset freezes and bans on providing economic resources or financing to designated individuals and entities.
Subsequent resolutions added nuclear scientists, organizations linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), defense entities, and parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the sanctions list.
Resolution 1747 expanded these restrictions to include grants, loans, and new credit lines.
Article 10 of Resolution 1803 emphasized monitoring financial transactions with Iranian banks — especially Bank Melli and Bank Saderat — to prevent Iran from using global financial systems to support its nuclear or missile programs.
The adoption of Resolution 1737 also established a sanctions committee to oversee the enforcement of the sanctions.
Four years later, Resolution 1929 established a panel of experts within the committee to collect enforcement data, analyze evasion tactics, and recommend practical measures.
