By Sara Poursabri
The Islamic Republic is currently facing the most serious crisis it has ever encountered in its history, and is taking advantage of the U.S.-Israeli war to step up the repression and executions of its own people.
That is the upshot of Kayhan Life’s recent conversation with Mahmoud Amiri-Moghaddam — a leading human rights activist who is the director of Iran Human Rights and a neuroscientist based in Norway.
Amiri-Moghaddam said human rights organizations and local sources played a crucial role in verifying reports of executions and countering government “disinformation” campaigns. He noted that there were serious obstacles to their work, such as threats to victims’ families and internet shutdowns.
Islamic Republic Escalates Death Sentences Against January Protestors
The conversation also focused on the value of United Nations Special Rapporteurs and other UN bodies. Although these mechanisms lack direct enforcement powers, Amiri-Moghaddam said, they can increase the political cost of human-rights violations and help ensure that such crimes are reported and not forgotten.
The following are excerpts from the conversation.
What are your documented statistics on the number of executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran from 2022 to the present? How many political protesters have been executed following the government’s killings and massacres up to now?
Because we publish our reports according to the Gregorian calendar, I will use 2023, 2024, and 2025 as examples. Over those three years, we recorded a total of 3,448 executions. In the first seven months of 2026, we recorded 444 executions that were verified and confirmed by two independent sources.

In those three years, as in the preceding years, more than 90 percent of executions were carried out on charges related to drug offenses or murder. Roughly 3 to 5 percent were generally carried out on security-related charges, such as moharebeh (“waging war against God”), mofsed-e-filarz (“corruption on Earth”), or baghi (“armed rebellion”).
This pattern changed in 2026. Of the 444 people who we were able to confirm through two independent sources and include in our statistics, about half — 227 people — were executed on murder charges. Among them were four protesters who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to Qisas (retributive justice).
Another 143 people, or roughly one-third of the total, were executed on drug-related charges, while 63 were executed on security-related charges. Among the latter were 24 protesters, 13 political prisoners affiliated with opposition groups, and 12 people accused of espionage or cooperation with foreign governments. Seven were executed for armed robbery, four for membership in ISIS, and 10 for rape.
Has the pattern of behavior of the judicial system and the government’s repression — in terms of executions, torture, arrests, and threats against victims — differed significantly from the periods before the National Lion and Sun Revolution (which began on Dec. 28, 2025)?
The execution of protesters and political prisoners actually began about three weeks after the start of the war this year. Since then, 28 protesters have been executed: 26 were connected to the January 2026 protests, and two were connected to the 2022 protests.
There were also 13 political prisoners affiliated with opposition groups and 12 people accused of espionage who were executed after the war began. In addition, two people had been executed on espionage charges in the first month of the year, bringing the total to 14.
To what extent have the two recent wars affected the behavior of the Islamic Republic’s repressive forces and judicial system?
What distinguishes this year — these past few months — from previous years is the unusually high number of political prisoners who have been executed, including protesters and members of opposition groups.
The execution of protesters and political prisoners on this scale and within such a short period is unprecedented — or at least extremely rare — over the past 30 years. We believe that there is a direct connection between this development, the January protests, and the outbreak of the war.
Normally, the execution of political prisoners and protesters provokes strong reactions from the international community and from people inside and outside Iran. However, this year, the Islamic Republic has taken advantage of the wartime circumstances to carry out these executions, because it knows that the political cost of executions is lower in wartime.
Unfortunately, the attention of the Western media and governments has been focused primarily on the war, allowing the Islamic Republic to execute protesters and political prisoners at minimal political cost.
Another important development that has facilitated the issuing of death sentences and other harsh sentences is the recent passage of legislation increasing penalties for espionage and cooperation with Israel. The legislation was approved by parliament following the 12-day war (June 13-24, 2025).
A significant number of protesters and others currently facing death sentences are being prosecuted under this law. There is no independent judiciary in the Islamic Republic. The authorities were already issuing death sentences, but now they can give them a more ostensibly legal context.
For example, under this new law, someone who sends a photograph or video to an overseas media outlet can receive a death sentence, whereas in the past, the authorities would have had to find additional charges against that person.
Overall, repression has intensified, and following the January protests, thousands of people have been arrested. The Islamic Republic is experiencing the greatest crisis in its history and is exploiting the wartime situation to intensify repression because it knows that the political cost will be lower.
What methods are used to document these executions despite government secrecy and censorship?
Iran Human Rights has monitored executions daily for 19 years and publishes an annual report. In recent years, before this year, official Iranian media generally announced only between 10 and 20 percent of executions.
Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the executions we can include in our statistics originate from our own sources. These include people inside prisons, families, lawyers, and other human-rights defenders.
We include only cases that have been confirmed by two independent sources in our reports. We know that the Islamic Republic sometimes launches disinformation campaigns to mislead the public. That is why it is so important to us that the statistics we publish follow a consistent methodology and meet a high standard of accuracy.
Internet shutdowns make this work more difficult, but even during such periods, we have been able to report the information. It simply reaches us with greater difficulty and greater delay.
Victims’ precise identities, the time and place of their execution, and the charges brought against them are usually determined with the help of local sources. What difficulties does this process involve?
The most serious problem is the danger faced by those who provide information. They come forward voluntarily, and both they and we understand the considerable risks involved.
Another major challenge is the Islamic Republic’s threats against families. Sometimes we can obtain accurate information directly from victims’ family members, but when those families are threatened by the government, obtaining and verifying information becomes much more difficult.
Disinformation campaigns present another serious obstacle. The government itself frequently publishes false information on social media, which we discover, after investigation, to be untrue. I believe the purpose of these disinformation campaigns is to undermine and discredit human-rights reports.
Filing complaints and sending open letters to UN special rapporteurs usually results in statements, expressions of regret, and expressions of concern. What is the fundamental purpose of this process? Is there a better alternative?
I disagree with the idea that this process is useless. In fact, these are among the tools we currently have at our disposal. I wish the UN had greater powers and stood more firmly with the people, but the UN has succeeded in establishing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which most countries in the world have signed.
Through that framework, we can at least increase the political cost of the Islamic Republic’s crimes. It was through this very mechanism of reporting and informing the UN that, in 2011, after a gap of more than 10 years, a special rapporteur on human rights in Iran was appointed.
The benefit of the special rapporteur is that at least twice a year, the Islamic Republic’s human-rights record has to be discussed and examined. This helps prevent the human-rights situation in Iran from being forgotten.
At the same time, when the UN special rapporteur publishes a report, it draws attention to the horrific scale of human-rights violations in Iran, and countries that consider themselves committed to human rights cannot simply remain silent in the face of those violations.
The reason the Islamic Republic, despite having stoning as a punishment in its laws — and despite issuing such sentences — cannot carry out stoning is precisely because of these international mechanisms.
However, I completely agree that this is not enough. We must make every possible effort to use all the mechanisms currently available to us — such as UN special rapporteurs and fact-finding committees — to the greatest possible extent in order to raise the cost for the Islamic Republic.
The Islamic Republic spends a great deal of money every year trying to avoid condemnation for human-rights violations in the UN General Assembly or the Human Rights Council. For that reason, we must make maximum use of these tools while also working to develop new mechanisms.
Is there a double standard among human-rights activists in their responses to the execution and repression of activists from different political movements?
I do not think there is any difference among genuine human-rights activists. Human-rights violations in any form should be reported, documented, and condemned. I think the main reason that reactions — particularly from the international community — to the execution of protesters in recent months have been weaker than they were during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” period is the war.
European countries in particular, which normally raise and condemn these issues, prioritize their own national interests. At present, their highest priorities are keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, preventing oil prices from rising, and ending the war. Consequently, human rights concerns have been neglected due to the war, a situation the Islamic Republic is exploiting.
As for human-rights organizations, I believe that we deal with every execution that reaches us in the same way we did four or ten years ago. We try, as far as possible, to gather accurate information and convey the voices of victims of human-rights violations to the international community, global public opinion, and everyone else.
Can media reporting alone — by breaching the news blackout and preventing the normalization of executions — help secure psychological and legal support for victims and bereaved families?
Media reporting is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Breaking the news blackout and preventing the normalization of executions is the first step toward increasing the political cost of these crimes.
The Islamic Republic uses executions not only to take people’s lives but also as a tool to spread fear throughout society and prevent protests. The greater the political cost, the greater the possibility of preventing future executions.
At the same time, information becomes a genuine support for victims and their families when it is accompanied by accurate documentation, legal follow-up, psychological support, and the creation of networks of solidarity. Families who feel that their voices are being heard are less likely to be left alone in the face of government pressure and threats. However, this is only the beginning.
One point that is discussed less often is the profound damage that executions inflict on society as a whole. Every execution has dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of victims — from family members and relatives to an entire society that, by witnessing the repeated use of such violence, becomes increasingly fearful, hopeless, and distrustful.
That is why opposing the death penalty is not merely about defending people who have been sentenced to death; it is about defending the right to life, human dignity, and the future of Iranian society.
We should also remember that an execution should never simply become another number in a statistic. Behind every execution is a human being, a family, and a life torn apart. If we can preserve and tell the human stories of the victims, public empathy will increase, and the government will find it more difficult to turn execution into an ordinary instrument of repression.
The slogan ‘No to the Death Penalty’ should become a central rallying cry in the struggle against the Islamic Republic, as executions are among the government’s most significant tools for ensuring its survival.












