By Ahmad Rafat
Recent developments in the Middle East — including the Gaza peace agreement, the rekindling of relations between Arab states and Israel, and the waning influence of proxy forces — suggest that a key chapter is being closed in the history of the Middle East, and that a new regional order is taking shape.
These developments send a clear and urgent signal to the Islamic Republic of Iran, one that Tehran cannot afford to overlook.
The Islamic Republic’s longstanding policy of “exporting the revolution” and backing proxy forces — a cornerstone of its foreign policy and regional influence since its inception 46 years ago — now appears increasingly ineffective.
The Islamic Republic’s costly support for groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq has not only strained the country’s finances and security, but has also steadily eroded its legitimacy across the region.
While the Israel-Hamas agreement may offer a path toward resolution for some Middle Eastern states, for the Islamic Republic, it marks the beginning of a new and uncertain chapter in its struggle for survival, and that of the so-called Axis of Resistance.
At this critical juncture, Iran faces a stark choice: persist with its confrontational stance toward the West and Israel — risking devastating war and internal collapse — or reassess its nuclear, military, and regional strategies, particularly its support for proxy groups.
As other regional powers pivot toward diplomacy and a new geopolitical framework, Iran remains mired in outdated tactics. A deepening internal legitimacy crisis has further eroded its ability to sustain the Axis of Resistance, casting serious doubt on its future as a regional power.
Following the announcement of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued the following statement: “Given the dangerous aspects of the ceasefire plan in Gaza, any decision on this matter rests with the Palestinian people and the resistance.”
The statement added that the Islamic Republic “welcomes any decision by them [Hamas] that brings an end to the genocide of Palestinians, ensures the withdrawal of Zionist forces from Gaza, upholds the Palestinian right to self-determination, and enables the delivery of humanitarian aid and the reconstruction of Gaza.”
Iran supported — and, according to some sources, even orchestrated — Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack to sabotage the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements initiated during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term which normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations, starting with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
To a degree, Tehran achieved its aim. The war in Gaza has, at least temporarily, stalled Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Accords. Countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, which had already signed on, have since scaled back their ties with Israel.
Yet this short-term strategic gain has come at a significant cost.
After Oct. 7, Israel did more than wage war in Gaza: It extended its military campaign to Lebanon, targeting and killing prominent Hezbollah figures, including former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, former head of the group’s Executive Council.
Israel also destroyed major Iranian arms depots in Lebanon.
Hamas suffered severe losses as well, including the deaths of its top political leader Ismail Haniyeh and military commander Yahya Sinwar, both former heads of the Hamas Political Bureau.
Meanwhile, Israeli strikes dealt heavy blows to the Houthis in Yemen.
In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad lost control of the country and sought refuge in Russia.
Meanwhile, the regional political landscape has shifted dramatically.
Qatar — once considered an ally of Iran — has emerged as a key player in the Middle East peace process.
Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which once maintained cooperative relations with Tehran, has now become a central partner in the new peace framework.
Even Lebanon — long influenced by Hezbollah’s role in its government — has begun to distance itself from Iran.
In a significant shift, Iran’s ambassador to Beirut recently revealed that Lebanon would turn down $40 million in Iranian aid. Under international pressure following the reactivation of the UN “snapback mechanism” — which reinstates prior sanctions and nuclear restrictions — Lebanon will also cut financial ties with Tehran.
Hezbollah, once Iran’s premier proxy force abroad, has been significantly weakened since Oct. 7, especially after Israel’s targeted assassinations of its senior leadership. Facing mounting public opposition in Lebanon to a broader war, Hezbollah has scaled back its attacks on Israel, defying Tehran’s expectations.
Still, while Arab and Western-backed Lebanese efforts to disarm Hezbollah have been discussed, no concrete steps have been taken, and none are expected soon.
Iran’s position in Iraq is similarly precarious. The PMF, a coalition of Shiite militias, are increasingly fragmented. Some factions — eyeing Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections on Nov. 11 — are distancing themselves from Tehran.
Others, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, both aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF), notably refrained from attacking U.S. forces during the Gaza conflict.
Iran’s regional setbacks go beyond its struggling proxies.
On Oct. 6, foreign ministers from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU) issued a joint statement at their summit (now institutionalized through a newly formed “Joint Council”) with several pointed references to Iran.
The ministers urged Iran to respect international law, uphold the UN Charter, and refrain from interfering in other countries’ affairs. They also called on Tehran to end its control of the disputed Persian Gulf islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa) claimed by the UAE.
This marks the second time in a year that the EU has labeled Iran’s presence on the islands an “occupation,” signaling a notable shift from earlier calls for arbitration.
The statement expressed alarm over Iran’s unresolved territorial disputes with the UAE and urged compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It also demanded that Iran provide assurances about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and halt the development of ballistic missiles and drones.
While acknowledging the reimposition of UN sanctions, the ministers stressed that this should not mark the end of diplomacy. They reaffirmed that a political solution remains the only viable path to resolving Iran’s nuclear issue.
Ultimately, the Axis of Resistance, once touted as Iran’s strategic buffer, now appears fractured and weakened.
Decades of investment by Tehran — both financial and political — in its proxy network have yielded diminishing returns. Countries that once tolerated or aligned with the Islamic Republic are now distancing themselves. Both domestically and abroad, Iran faces deepening isolation and a growing erosion of legitimacy.
