By Kayhan Life Staff
On July 6, Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president of the 14th government of the Islamic Republic of Iran amidst a muddle of crises across all sectors. Even the most optimistic analysts deem these problems insurmountable, so fundamental changes in the regime’s core policies — particularly its foreign policy — are needed to tackle them.
Despite the reformist movement’s assertion that Pezeshkian, backed by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will enact changes in the regime’s policies — including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal — the Islamic Republic is grappling with hugely complex challenges.
Even if Pezeshkian had solutions to address these crises, as the head of the Iranian government, he has no authority to alter the situation. Khamenei and the regime’s core powers determine the state’s fundamental policies, and there is no sign that the regime intends to change these core strategies.
Moreover, the Islamic Republic’s opponents have questioned Pezeshkian’s election victory, alleging that the reported voter turnout was inflated to boost the government’s reputation.
They argue that certain institutions that could have been effective inside Iran instead collaborated with the regime’s lobbyists abroad and some Western political think tanks to launch a campaign depicting Pezeshkian as a catalyst for change in Iran.
Traditionally, any government’s foreign policy’s primary focus is to safeguard national interests. However, historically and since its inception, the foundational principles and pillars of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy have not been primarily centered on preserving national interests or the nation’s welfare.
Instead, Khamenei aims to establish a new Islamic civilization, prepare for the coming of the Shia 12th Imam Mahdi, and institute the “Mahdi world order.”
Furthermore, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is centered on aligning with the East (China and Russia), supporting the “axis of resistance” (regional militias), and displaying hostility towards Israel.
ANALYSIS: Iran’s New President Masoud Pezeshkian Is No Moderate
Also, while previous Iranian presidents had discussed the necessity for changes in foreign policy, Pezeshkian has yet to address this issue.
From the onset of his election campaign, Pezeshkian outlined his responsibilities, and during debates, he specified that his primary focus in foreign policy was to adhere to the directives of the Supreme Leader.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian foreign minister (in office from 2013 to 2021) and a key member of Pezeshkian’s election campaign, leveled various criticisms against Pezeshkian’s opponents to attract more votes for him.
Notably, Zarif’s strategy involved criticizing Saeed Jalili’s foreign policy rather than directly targeting Khamenei. However, serving as the foreign minister for eight years, Zarif knows only too well that the ultimate decision-making power within the regime rested with Khamenei rather than the president or foreign minister.
Even if Western leaders choose to ignore this reality, the public in Iran understands that the leader of the Islamic Republic’s authority and the primary power in the state’s foreign policy are unalterable processes that extend beyond strategic and macro-level issues.
In standard diplomatic assignments, which fall under the purview of the Foreign Ministry, the Iranian government and its foreign minister have no real power.
Over the years, many appointments of ambassadors from the Islamic Republic, particularly to countries like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon — which are deemed integral to the “axis of resistance” by the Islamic Republic — have been orchestrated through the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) rather than managed by the Foreign Ministry.
The notion that the government cannot be reformed is a widespread belief among Iranian people.
This sentiment stems from the understanding that the government and its cabinet are merely puppets of the Supreme Leader. Many people also suspect Khamenei is beholden to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Given the low level of participation in the election because of the boycott, Pezeshkian will lead a minority government rather than having total power.
Critics and opponents across various perspectives argue that Pezeshkian lacks the capability or desire to enact significant changes to the regime’s general policies. Some suggest that his voter base is notably weaker and smaller than previous government leaders, positioning him more of an “organizer” in practical terms.
The primary distinguishing factor between Pezeshkian and his rivals in foreign policy during the election campaigns was his focus on advocating for Iran’s membership in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
However, Khamenei’s decision ultimately led to Iran abstaining from joining the Palermo Convention, which targets transnational organized crime, and the CFT, which aims to combat terrorism financing.
The FATF is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 at the initiative of the G7 to develop policies to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. It operates under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental economic organization with 36 member countries, founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade.
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, also called the Palermo Convention) is a 2000 UN-sponsored multilateral treaty against transnational organized crime.
During a June 20, 2018, speech, Khamenei ended all discussions on FATF by stating that “there was no necessity to partake in problematic conventions.”
In February 2019, eight ministers in then-President Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet wrote a letter to Khamenei requesting his intervention regarding joining the FATF. However, this request had no impact, as the top echelons of the regime argued that joining the FATF would “weaken the resistance and enhance the effectiveness of smart [targeted] sanctions.”
In February 2021, during an interview with the Tehran-based Etemad newspaper, Zarif mentioned that he had no control over foreign policy decisions while serving as the foreign minister. He criticized the IRGC’s interference, particularly that of the late Lieutenant-General Ghasem Soleimani, the former commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force (IRGC-QF).
An incident illustrating this was when Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad visited Tehran without coordinating with Zarif. This led to Soleimani accompanying Assad during his meeting with Khamenei. This event prompted Zarif to resign on Instagram, which he later withdrew.
In response to Zarif’s criticisms regarding such interventions, Khamenei stated in May 2021 that “the Foreign Ministry plays a role in determining policies but is not the ultimate decision-maker; rather, it implements those decisions.”
“In our nation, the Supreme National Security Council, with officials’ participation, plays a role in determining foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry is then responsible for executing these policies through its methods,” Khamenei added.
The current priority for the regime is to prevent the activation of the “snapback mechanism,” which would reintroduce suspended UN resolutions on Iran and effectively nullify the JCPOA.
Although reformists claim that Pezeshkian, with Khamenei’s approval, intends to revive the JCPOA despite its near demise, evidence suggests that the regime is ramping up uranium enrichment, potentially for the development of an atomic bomb. The situation becomes even more critical when individuals close to Khamenei discuss altering the nuclear doctrine.
In the period leading up to the July presidential elections, Kamal Kharazi, the head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and Zarif’s former deputy, Abbas Araghchi, one of Pezeshkian’s potential candidates for the position of foreign minister in his cabinet, hinted that Tehran might reassess its nuclear program.
Meanwhile, changes occurring in the global arena do not appear to favor the Islamic Republic.
Western governments acknowledge that all efforts made over the past three decades have been unsuccessful, extinguishing any hope that the Islamic Republic’s aggressive policies will change with Pezeshkian’s election as the new Iranian president.
General Sir Patrick Sanders, the former British army commander, recently warned that the UK and NATO could face a third world war within the next five years. He emphasized that there is a real possibility of an attack on the territories of NATO member countries if significant re-equipment efforts are not undertaken.
“Britain and NATO must rearm or face the threat of WW3 within five years with Russia-China-Iran ‘Axis’ now more dangerous than the Nazis,” Daily Mail reported on July 9, quoting General Sanders.
The NATO member states’ leaders issued a statement on July 10 affirming that they continued to view Russia as the primary threat to their nations. However, they also cautioned that the actions of the Islamic Republic posed a significant danger to NATO and its allies. The leaders highlighted the military collaboration between Tehran and Moscow and Iran’s ongoing supply of ballistic missiles and drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine.
“Belarus, North Korea, and the Islamic Republic of Iran are supporting Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine by supplying direct military aid to Russia, which includes ammunition and drones,” the statement said.
Some European governments, such as those of Germany and the Netherlands, have taken the initial steps to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization.
Regarding the potential for a shift in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy following Pezeshkian’s election, White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby remarked on July 8 that “unfortunately, we do not expect any change in the behavior of the Iranian authorities.”
U.S. officials, including various senators and members of Congress, have expressed skepticism that Pezeshkian will steer Tehran’s stance towards “moderation.”
In the Islamic Republic, certain issues are not open for discussion, such as the government’s opposition to Israel, its provision of financial and military backing to proxy groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
The PMF, also known as the People’s Mobilization Committee (PMC) and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of some 40 militias that are mostly Shia Muslim groups, but also include Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi groups.
The security and military ties with Russia, which include supplying various drones and missiles to support Russia in its conflict with Ukraine under the “Looking to the East” policy, will remain unchanged despite the change in government in Iran.
The Iranian regime will continue its enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, the development and testing of missiles capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, maintaining a military presence in Syria, Iraq, and along Lebanon’s borders, as well as resorting to taking foreign citizens and dual nationals as hostages to leverage in negotiations with Western nations.
These actions serve as critical components of Iran’s foreign policy strategy to establish and reinforce its authority on the global stage.
The evidence shows that Pezeshkian lacks both the capacity and inclination to alter Iran’s security and military ties with Russia, its strategic partnership with China, hostility towards Israel, or the cessation of financial and military backing to proxy groups.
Pezeshkian goes beyond the regime’s expectations to embrace these relationships.
During a phone call with Bashar Al-Asad on July 10, Pezeshkian said: “The Islamic Republic’s policies, guided by the esteemed Supreme Leader, will persist in supporting Palestine, the resistance movement, and Syria as Iran’s strategic ally.”
In a letter sent to Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, four days after his election victory celebrations, Pezeshkian stated: “The resistance of the people in the region against the illegitimate Zionist regime has always been supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
“This resistance is deeply rooted in Iran’s fundamental policies, the teachings of Imam Khomeini, and the directives of the Supreme Leader, and it will continue with vigor,” He added.
Notably, the Tehran-based hardline Kayhan newspaper has criticized the reformist newspapers for not publishing Pezeshkian’s message to Nasrallah on their front pages.
The reformists’ portrayal of Pezeshkian has misled people in the West.
In a similar letter to Ismail Haniyeh, the chief political leader of Hamas, Pezeshkian said: “We will support the Palestinian resistance against Israel until the liberation of Qods [Jerusalem].”
In an editorial published on July 10, London-based Qatari pan-Arab news outlet Al-Araby Al-Jadeed (The New Arab) Pezeshkian said: “The top priority of Iran’s foreign policy is to expand cooperation with its neighbors.”
He was referencing Khamenei’s classification of Iran’s neighbors, which include Oman, Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE, which are vital diplomatic intermediaries for Iran and serve as conduits for financial transactions that enable Tehran to engage in money laundering and evade sanctions.
Zarif left no stone unturned to promote Pezeshkian, highlighting the need to lift sanctions. He said, “Almost most of the roads are closed to us,” and adding Khamenei himself is “the solution to the crisis!”
